How States Use Cost-Growth Benchmark Programs to Contain Health Care Costs
/in Health System Costs Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Washington Charts, Featured News Home Consumer Affordability, Health System Costs, Hospital/Health System Oversight, Making the Case for Action, Total Cost of Care Benchmark /by Deborah Fournier and Adney RakotoniainaHospital Cost Tool and Resources
/in Health System Costs, Policy Featured News Home Consumer Affordability, Health System Costs, Hospital/Health System Oversight, Making the Case for Action, State Employee Health Plans Hospital/Health System Oversight, State Employee Health Plans /by NASHP StaffA Model Act for State Oversight of Proposed Health Care Mergers
/in Health System Costs, Model Legislation and Resources, Policy Consumer Affordability, Health System Costs, Hospital/Health System Oversight, Making the Case for Action /by NASHP StaffSection 1: Definitions.
(A) As used in [this Act], the following words shall have the following meanings:
- “Health care entity” means a health care provider, health care facility, or provider organization.
- “Health care facility” means a licensed institution providing health care services or a health care setting, including, but not limited to, hospitals and other licensed inpatient facilities, ambulatory surgical or treatment centers, skilled nursing facilities, residential treatment centers, diagnostic, laboratory and imaging centers, imaging centers, free-standing emergency facilities, outpatient clinics, and rehabilitation and other therapeutic health settings.
- “Health care provider” means any person, corporation, partnership, governmental unit, state institution or any other entity qualified or licensed under state law to perform or provide health care services.
- “Health care services” means supplies, care, and services of medical, behavioral health, substance use disorder, mental health, surgical, optometric, dental, podiatric, chiropractic, psychiatric, therapeutic, diagnostic, preventative, rehabilitative, supportive or geriatric nature.
- “Material change transaction” means any of the following, occurring during a single transaction or in a series of related transactions [within a consecutive 12-month period]:
a. A corporate merger including one or more health care entities;
b. An acquisition of one or more health care entities, including insolvent health care entities. For the purposes of [this Act], “acquisition” means the direct or indirect purchase in any manner, including, but not limited to, lease, transfer, exchange, option, receipt of a conveyance, creation of a joint venture, or any other manner of purchase, such as by a health care system, private equity group, hedge fund, of a material amount of the assets or operations of a health care provider;
[Note: States may have a statutory definition of the word “material”. If not, policymakers may consider defining it in regulation.]
c. Any affiliation, arrangement, or contract that results in a change of control for a health care entity. For the purposes of [this Act], “change of control” means an arrangement in which any other person, corporation, partnership, or any other entity acquires direct or indirect control over the operations of a health care facility or provider in whole or in substantial part. For purposes of this section, an “arrangement” shall include any agreement, association, partnership, joint venture, or other arrangement that results in a change of governance or control for a health care entity;
d. The formation of a partnership, joint venture, accountable care organization, parent organization or management services organization for the purpose of administering contracts with carriers, third party administrators, pharmacy benefit managers or providers;
e. A sale, purchase, lease, affiliation or transfer of control of a board of directors that involves a hospital.
6. “Material change transaction” does not include any of the following:
a. A clinical affiliation of health care entities formed for the purpose of collaborating on clinical trials; or
b. Graduate medical education programs; or
c. The mere offer of employment to, or hiring of, a physician.
7. “Provider organization” means any corporation, partnership, business trust, association or organized group of persons, which is in the business of health care delivery or management, whether incorporated or not that represents 1 or more health care providers in contracting with carriers for the payments of heath care services; provided, that ”provider organization” shall include, but not be limited to, physician organizations, physician-hospital organizations, independent practice associations, provider networks, accountable care organizations and any other organization that contracts with carriers for payment for health care services.
Section 2: Notice.
(A) Any health care entity shall, before consummating any material change transaction, submit written notice to the Attorney General, state Department of Health, [and the state cost commission] not fewer than [60 days] before the date of the proposed material change transaction.
(B) Written notice shall include and contain the information the Attorney General [or the Department of Health or state cost commission] determines is required. The health care entity may include any additional information supporting the written notice of the material change transaction.
(C) Within [10 days] of receiving written notice of a material change transaction, the Attorney General shall post to the Attorney General’s website information about the material change transaction including:
- A summary of the proposed transaction;
- An explanation of the groups or individuals likely to be impacted by the transaction;
- Information about services currently provided by the health care entity, commitments by the health care entity to continue such services and any services that will be reduced or eliminated;
- Details about any public hearings and how to submit comments;
- The notice and other materials submitted by the health care entity, except for materials that the Attorney General determines would cause public harm.
Section 3: Preliminary Review
(A) Within [30 days] after receiving a notice described in [Section 2 of this Act], the Attorney General shall do one of the following:
- Approve the material change transaction and notify the health care entity in writing that a comprehensive review is not required for the material change transaction;
- Approve the material change transaction subject to conditions set by the Attorney General and notify the health care entity in writing of the conditions under which the transaction may be completed; OR
- Notify the health care entity [and state cost commission] in writing that the transaction is subject to a comprehensive review. The Attorney General may request additional information necessary to perform a comprehensive review under [Section 4 of this Act].
(B) A comprehensive review is required when any of the following apply to the material change transaction:
- Will result in the transfer of assets valued above [$2 million];
- Occurs in a highly consolidated market for any line of services offered by any party to the material change transaction;
- Will cause a significant change in market share, such that any resulting health care entity possesses market power upon completion;
- If either party to the material change transaction possesses market power prior to the transaction;
- If the Attorney General, at the Attorney General’s sole discretion, determines that the material change transaction is likely to have a material impact on the cost, quality, or access to health care services in any region in the state.
(C) For purposes of [this section], “market power” means possessing 30% or more market share in any line of service in the relevant geographic area or under other criteria that the Attorney General may define by regulation
[Note: Policymakers may need to define some of these terms and specify how they are to be calculated in regulation. States may also use regulation to specify additional criteria that trigger comprehensive review. Additionally, the market power thresholds may not capture vertical or cross-market mergers, so policymakers may want to specify when non-horizontal mergers should trigger comprehensive review in regulation based on market conditions in the state.]
(D) Nothing in this section limits or infringes upon the existing authority of any state agency including the Department of Health, Department of Insurance, [state cost commission], or the Attorney General to review any transactions.
[Note: This clause is intented to preserve existing review processes in a state by a Certificate of Need program, the Department of Health, and or by the Attorney General for transactions involving charitable trust concerns for non-profit transactions.]Section 4: Comprehensive Review Process
(A) No later than [30 days] after determining a transaction is subject to a comprehensive review, the Attorney General shall:
-
- Conduct one or more public meetings, one of which shall be in the county in which the health care entity is located, to hear comments from interested parties; and
- [Notify the state cost commission of the determination under Section 3 of the proposed material change or contract with consultants to] produce a cost and market impact review (CMIR) report.
(B) The CMIR report may examine factors relating to the proposed transaction, transacting parties, and their relative market position, including, but not limited to:
- The market share of any transacting party;
- Any previous transaction involving either transacting party, including, but not limited to acquisitions or mergers of similar health care providers;
- The prices charged by either of the transacting parties for services, including its relative price compared to other providers for the same services in the same geographic area;
- The quality of the services provided by any health care provider(s) party to the transaction, including patient experience;
- The cost and cost trends of the health care provider in comparison to total health care expenditures statewide;
- The availability and accessibility of services similar to those provided, or proposed to be provided, through the provider or provider organization within its primary service areas and dispersed service areas;
- The impact of the material change transaction on competing options for the delivery of health care services within its primary service areas and dispersed service areas;
- The role of the transacting parties in serving at-risk, underserved, and government payer patient populations;
- The role of the transacting parties in providing low margin or negative margin services within its primary service areas and dispersed service areas;
- Consumer concerns, including but not limited to, complaints or other allegations that the provider or provider organization has engaged in any unfair method of competition or any unfair or deceptive act or practice; and
- Any other factors that the Attorney General or the [state cost commission or consultant] determines to be in the public interest.
(C) The Attorney General [or state cost commission] may request additional information or documents from the transacting parties necessary to conduct a CMIR. Failure to respond or insufficient responses to requests for information by transacting parties may result in the extension of the deadline for the Attorney General or state cost commission to complete the CMIR, the imposition of conditions for approval, or the disapproval of the material change transaction.
(D) The Attorney General [and state cost commission] shall keep confidential all nonpublic information and documents obtained under [this section] and shall not disclose the confidential information or documents to any person without the consent of the party that produced the confidential information or documents, except that the Attorney General may disclose any information to an expert or consultant under contract with the office of the Attorney General to review the proposed transaction, provided that the expert or consultant is bound by the same confidentiality requirements as the office of the Attorney General. The confidential information and documents shall not be public records and shall be exempt from [state open records act].
(E) In addition to commissioning a CMIR report, the Attorney General may, in his or her sole discretion:
-
- Contract with, consult, and receive advice from any state agency [including the Department of Health, Department of Insurance, or any other state agency] on those terms and conditions that the Attorney General deems appropriate.
- Contract with experts or consultants to assist in reviewing the proposed agreement or transaction.
(F) Not more that [185 days] after receiving written notice from the Attorney General that the transaction is subject to a comprehensive review under [Section 4], the [state cost commission or consultant] shall submit to the Attorney General a CMIR report; provided that the health care entity has complied with the Attorney General’s [or state cost commission’s] requests for information or documents pursuant [this section] within [21 days] of the request or by a later date set by mutual agreement of the health care entity and the Attorney General [or state cost commission].
[Note: Nothing in this section prevents policymakers from creating a streamlined process in regulation to conduct a smaller CMIR with reduced timelines to review smaller transactions with few competitive concerns.](G) The Attorney General [and state cost commission] shall be entitled to [charge costs to or receive reimbursement from] the transacting parties for all actual, reasonable, direct costs incurred in reviewing, evaluating, and making the determination referred to in [this section], including administrative costs.
[Note: Lawmakers should follow existing state law regarding procurement practices when drafting this section to determine whether the Attorney General should be reimbursed or whether the transacting parties should be billed directly. The Attorney General should maintain complete discretion in choosing consultants or experts to review the transaction.]Section 5: Approval Authority
(A) The Attorney General shall have discretion to approve, conditionally approve, or disapprove of any material change transaction for which the Attorney General receives notice under [Section 2 of this Act].
(B) The Attorney General shall inform the health care entity of the determination within [30 days of notice under Section 2], or in the case of comprehensive review, within [30 days of the Attorney General’s receipt of the CMIR]. No proposed material change transaction may be completed before the Attorney General has informed the health care entity of the Attorney General’s determination.
(C) In making the determination, the Attorney General may consider any factors that the Attorney General deems relevant, including, but not limited to:
- The likely impact, as described in the CMIR report where applicable, of the material change on:
a. The growth in patient costs;
b. The availability or accessibility of health care services to the affected community;
c. Provider cost trends and containment of total state health care spending;
d. Access to services in medically underserved areas;
e. Rectifying historical and contemporary factors contributing to a lack of health equities or access to services;
f. The functioning of the markets for healthcare and health insurance;
g. The potential for the material change transaction to affect health outcomes or health equity for residents of this state; or
h. the potential loss or change in access to essential services.
2. Whether the material change transaction is proper under [state antitrust laws];
3. Whether the benefits of the transaction are likely to outweigh the anticompetitive effects from the transaction;
4. If the transaction is in the public interest.
[Note: Lawmakers should tailor this non-exhaustive list of factors to state priorities. Lawmakers may want to list specific services in Section 5 (C)(i)(g) or choose to define “essential services” in regulation and to help define when transactions are in the public interest. As above, lawmakers should note if their state has a statutory definition of “public interest” and if that definition is appropriate here. ](D) This section does not limit or alter any existing authority of the Attorney General or any state agency to enforce any other law including state or federal antitrust law or to review non-profit transactions.
Section 6: Post-transaction Oversight
(A) The Attorney General may enforce conditions imposed by a conditional approval pursuant to [Section 5] to the fullest extent provided by law. In addition to any legal remedies the Attorney General may have, the Attorney General shall be entitled to specific performance, injunctive relief, and other equitable remedies a court deems appropriate for breach of any of the conditions and shall be entitled to recover its attorney’s fees and costs incurred in remedying each violation.
(B) In order to monitor effectively ongoing compliance with the terms and conditions of any transaction, the Attorney General may, in his or her sole discretion, contract with experts and consultants to assist in this regard.
(C) One year, two years, and five years after the completion of the material change transaction approved or conditionally approved by the Attorney General after a comprehensive review under [Section 4], the health care entity or the person, corporation, partnership, or any other entity that acquired direct or indirect control over the health care entity must submit reports to the Attorney General that:
- Demonstrate compliance with conditions placed on the transaction, if any; and
- Analyze cost trends and cost growth trends of the parties to the transactions.
(D) The Attorney General shall be entitled to [charge costs to or receive reimbursement from] the transacting parties for all actual, reasonable, and direct costs incurred in monitoring ongoing compliance with the terms and conditions of the sale or transfer of assets, including contract and administrative costs.
[Note: Lawmakers should follow existing state law regarding procurement practices when drafting this section to determine whether the Attorney General should be reimbursed or whether the transacting parties should be billed directly. The Attorney General should maintain complete discretion in choosing consultants or experts to review the transaction.](E) Contract costs shall not exceed an amount that is reasonable and necessary to conduct the review and evaluation. The transacting parties shall pay the Attorney General promptly for all contract costs.
Section 7: Regulations
(A) The Attorney General [or state cost commission] may adopt regulations implementing [this Act].
What’s New in NASHP’s Updated Hospital Cost Calculator?
/in Policy Blogs, Featured News Home Consumer Affordability, Health System Costs, Hospital/Health System Oversight, Making the Case for Action, Total Cost of Care Benchmark /by Adney Rakotoniaina and Marilyn BartlettQ&A: What States Can Learn from NASHP’s Hospital Cost Tool
/in Policy Blogs, Featured News Home Consumer Affordability, Health System Costs, Hospital/Health System Oversight, Making the Case for Action /by NASHP StaffA Tool for States to Address Health Care Consolidation: Prohibiting Anticompetitive Health Plan Contracts
/in Policy Featured News Home, Reports Consumer Affordability, Health System Costs, Hospital/Health System Oversight, Making the Case for Action, State Employee Health Plans /by Katherine L. Gudiksen, PhD, MS, Erin Fuse Brown, JD, MPH and Johanna ButlerRampant consolidation in nearly every state has created dominant health care systems that can use anticompetitive contracting practices to charge supracompetitive prices, especially to commercial insurance plans.
Read or download NASHP’s new model law, Prohibiting Anticompetitive Contract Terms in Health Care Contracts.
With COVID-19 expected to accelerate the consolidation of health care providers, state policymakers are searching for tools to curtail the abuse of market power by dominant health providers. To create a more level playing field for negotiations, the National Academy for State Health Policy has developed a new model law that bans anticompetitive contract terms using states’ consumer protection and antitrust laws. This report describes how the model act can give states essential tools to help them rein in rising health care costs.
Overview
Rising health care costs from provider consolidation represent a critical financial challenge for states. High health care costs present states with policy tradeoffs – leaving costs unchecked means fewer state resources to invest in other priorities, such as social determinants of health, health equity, and other, non-health areas such as education and infrastructure. Private-sector employers and individuals who purchase insurance reel under increased premiums driven in large part by rising hospital costs. Without effective tools to slow the growth of health care costs, health spending will continue to threaten public and private resources in every other area.
A primary driver of rising health care costs is the wave of health care consolidation that gives consolidated providers market leverage to raise prices unhampered by competitive forces.[1] Nearly all major metropolitan hospital markets are highly concentrated.[2] Nationwide, as of 2018, more than half of all physicians and 72 percent of hospitals were affiliated with a health system.[3] Evidence suggests that provider consolidation leads to higher hospital and physician prices and higher total expenditures – all while having little to no impact on improving quality of care, reducing utilization, or improving efficiency.[4]
Rampant consolidation has created dominant health systems that can use anticompetitive contracting practices to charge supracompetitive prices, especially to commercial insurance plans.[5] As the COVID-19 pandemic will likely accelerate consolidation of health care providers with strained resources,[6] policymakers are searching for ways to limit the impact of increased provider market power on health care costs. In many states, it is not enough to try to prevent consolidation from occurring through pre-merger review because most state and metropolitan markets are already highly concentrated. In these already consolidated markets, states need tools to curtail the abuse of market power by dominant health providers.
Although state attorneys general may be able to prosecute anticompetitive behavior — such as the use of anticompetitive contracting provisions by dominant systems — under current antitrust authority, legislation prohibiting these contract clauses is necessary to improve state enforcement authority and disrupt the distorted bargaining dynamic between health insurers and powerful providers. State officials have routinely heard that insurers lack proper leverage to negotiate contract terms to reduce hospital and physician costs. To address the harms from anticompetitive contract provisions and create a more level playing field for negotiations, the National Academy for State Health Policy (NASHP) has developed a model act, Prohibiting Anticompetitive Contract Terms in Health Care Contracts. The model act prohibits four common anticompetitive contract terms, making the use of these provisions presumptively unlawful under a state’s consumer protection and antitrust laws.
Anticompetitive Contracting Practices by Consolidated Entities
One of the primary ways that dominant providers raise prices is through anticompetitive health plan contracting,[7] in which powerful provider groups and health systems exploit their market power to demand terms in their contracts with health insurance plans. When health care markets become consolidated, a dominant health system may control multiple hospitals, multi-specialty physician practices, clinics, and ancillary service providers. Due to network adequacy laws, some services or providers are considered “must-haves,” such as a hospital with a neonatal intensive care unit or trauma facility, for a health plan to offer a commercially viable provider network. Health plans must ensure their provider networks are robust enough for their members to have access to essential services.
Insurers typically have two options for containing costs in competitive contracting:
- Exclude high-cost, low-value providers from the network, or
- Give consumers an incentive to choose more cost-effective alternatives.[8]
Consolidated health systems leverage their market power in negotiations with insurers because the insurer cannot afford to exclude must-have providers from its network. Dominant health systems can use all-or-nothing negotiations to raise prices for all of their affiliated providers by threatening to prevent any of their providers from participating in the insurer’s network unless the insurer accepts the prices and terms set by the health system. These types of distorted negotiations between providers and insurers directly contribute to higher costs for states, employers, and patients. The four contracting practices that have raised the most concern among antitrust enforcers and lawmakers, and those that are targeted in the NASHP model act, are: (1) all-or-nothing contracting; (2) anti-tiering or anti-steering clauses; (3) most-favored-nation clauses; and (4) gag clauses.
All-or-nothing contracting: Health systems may use all-or-nothing provisions to leverage the status of their must-have providers or facilities in highly concentrated markets to demand higher payment rates for the entire system, including those providers in more competitive locations and specialties.[9] An all-or-nothing provision requires the health plan to contract with all providers in that system or none of them. The insurer then faces a difficult choice – include all of the health systems’ facilities and providers in the network (even those of lower value or where there are other competitive choices) or lose all of them, which means the plan will not have a commercially viable provider network anywhere the health system has a must-have provider. By bargaining on behalf of all its affiliates, a powerful health system can thus raise the prices for its less desirable providers by tying them to must-have providers.
Anti-tiering or anti-steering clauses: Tiered networks and steering incentives are cost-saving strategies used by insurers to encourage patients to seek higher value care. When using tiered networks, insurers place providers into tiers based on price and quality and then offer patients financial incentives, typically through lower cost-sharing, to choose providers from a higher-value tier. When health systems use anti-tiering, they require a health plan to place that system’s facilities or providers in the most preferred tier, even if the health system’s providers do not meet the insurers’ cost or quality standards for the highest-value tier. In the case of anti-steering provisions, the health system may forbid the insurer from using cost-sharing incentives to steer patients to other providers, even if they offer better value. Dominant health systems use anti-tiering or anti-steering provisions to stop health plans from implementing these cost-control measures and thereby avoid competition.
Gag clauses: Gag clauses may prevent either party in a contract from disclosing terms of that agreement, including prices, to a third party. While many states have laws requiring insurers to disclose out-of-pocket costs to enrollees, only a few states have laws allowing patients, plan sponsors (such as an employer), or even state regulators to obtain negotiated price or quality information.[10] As a result, patients and employers may be unable to access necessary information to make informed choices between providers, both for individual health care services and network inclusion. The lack of transparency from gag clauses and the mistaken notion that prices are trade secrets:[11]
- Undermine price transparency tools for consumers;
- Decrease plan sponsors’ ability to push back on rising prices; and
- Make it more difficult for policymakers to understand how health care markets are operating in their state.
Gag clauses may be especially insidious when used in conjunction with other anticompetitive contract terms. For example, they may be used to hide the magnitude of variation in provider rates and therefore obscure the effects of an anti-steering clause.
Most-favored-nation (MFN) clauses: Unlike the other contract clauses included in the NASHP model, most-favored-nation clauses are typically used by a dominant insurer, sometimes in concert with a dominant health system. MFN clauses, sometimes called “pricing parity” or “price protection” clauses, are contractual agreements in which a provider or health system agrees not to offer lower prices to any other insurer. Dominant insurers thus ensure that they are getting the best prices. At first glance, these terms may appear to be pro-competitive because the health system is agreeing to lower their contracted prices with the insurer if the health system accepts a lower price from one of its competitors. Effectively, however, MFNs ensure that no rival insurer can negotiate with the health system to offer a novel insurance product (e.g., a narrow network) at lower rates. In addition, MFNs may allow insurers and providers to collude to raise prices. Insurers can accept an anticompetitive price increase from a dominant provider without competitive disadvantage because the insurer can pass the increase through to consumers in the form of higher premiums, as long as they know all competitors must also pay the same or higher rates.[12]
State Antitrust Enforcement: A Resource-Intensive, Insufficient Solution
Recent lawsuits by state and federal antitrust enforcers and private plaintiffs have exposed how dominant health systems use contracting practices to increase prices and limit the ability of payers to control costs.[13] High-profile cases by then-California Attorney General Xavier Becerra against Sutter Health[14] and North Carolina Attorney General Josh Stein against Atrium Health[15] targeted those dominant health systems’ use of anticompetitive terms in their health plan contracts, including all-or-nothing bargaining, anti-tiering, and anti-steering clauses that prevented private health plans from using financial incentives to encourage patients to choose lower-cost providers, and gag clauses that barred health plans from sharing price and quality information with patients.
While state attorneys general can use existing antitrust enforcement authority to address the anticompetitive contracting, bringing a case is resource-intensive, lengthy, and can be difficult to prove. Even if a settlement imposes conduct remedies and monetary penalties against the dominant health system, settlements avoid trial and do not establish legal precedent for future enforcement actions.[16] As Emilio Varanini, deputy attorney general in the antitrust section of the California Department of Justice, has argued, “while litigation can blaze the way for addressing such anticompetitive conduct, ultimately legislation may be a far more effective tool for carrying out competition as a policy goal.”[17] Beyond easing enforcement, in states that have passed legislation curtailing one or more of these contracting practices, one of the key benefits is that it alters the bargaining dynamic between powerful providers and health insurers by strengthening the ability of insurers’ to resist providers’ anticompetitive terms (and less-powerful providers’ ability to resist dominant insurers’ most-favored nation terms). NASHP’s model act builds on lessons learned from these recent, high-profile legal cases and gives states a tool to prohibit anticompetitive contract clauses through legislation.
Prohibiting Anticompetitive Contracting through NASHP’s Model Act
The NASHP model act also prohibits health care providers, health insurers, and plan administrators from demanding, soliciting, or agreeing to any health care contract that contains anticompetitive contract terms. The model specifically prohibits all-or-nothing, anti-steering, or anti-tiering, MFNs, and gag clauses, however it gives a state’s insurance commissioner or attorney general the ability to add other clauses through regulation that may result in anticompetitive effects. This flexibility is important as dominant health care entities’ contracting strategies may evolve to protect their market share and raise prices in response to these prohibitions. The model renders these prohibited contract clauses null and void and presumptively unlawful.
Although there is growing evidence that these health care contract provisions are used anticompetitively and pose a serious threat to competition, there could be pro-competitive uses of these clauses and, in some specific cases in health care markets, they may be used to lower costs.[18] To allow for potential pro-competitive uses of these contract provisions, the model act does include a waiver process where the attorney general or insurance commissioner could approve the use of these contract terms if the benefits outweigh the harms. The regulating state agency is authorized to promulgate rules on which arrangements may be eligible for waivers, such as accountable care organizations, value-based payment arrangements, or those involving rural or other safety-net providers.
The NASHP model is designed to give enforcement authority to both the attorney general and the insurance commissioner in order to ensure broad enforcement and oversight of health system behavior and health care contracts. The attorney general and the insurance commissioner would have the authority to investigate, audit, and review any documents to ensure compliance with the law and to impose penalties for violations under state Unfair and Deceptive Acts or Practices (UDAP) laws. Importantly, the model also includes a private right of action to allow parties injured by these contract clauses to recover damages.
Conclusion
In highly consolidated markets, dominant health systems use their market power to demand anticompetitive terms in their contracts with health insurers, thus increasing prices and thwarting health insurers’ cost-containment efforts. In the post-pandemic world, state policymakers face limited state resources and rising health care consolidation. The NASHP model act provides policymakers with a tool to prevent already consolidated entities from further exploiting their market power to raise prices and restrict competition. A legislative ban will ease antitrust enforcement and eliminate the resource-intensive, fact-specific determination of harm in litigation. Legislation prohibiting anticompetitive contract terms will level the playing field between health insurers and dominant health systems, giving insurers the bargaining leverage to resist price demands of dominant systems and to direct patients to higher-value options. The NASHP model is an important step in state efforts to mitigate the harms that result from the significant consolidation in provider and insurer markets over the past decades, while also preparing states for the expected rise in consolidation after the pandemic.
Notes
- Erin C. Fuse Brown, State Strategies to Address Rising Prices Caused by Health Care Consolidations, NASHP (Sept. 2017), https://www.oldsite.nashp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Consolidation-Report.pdf; Erin C. Fuse Brown, State Policies to Address Vertical Consolidation in Health Care, NASHP (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.oldsite.nashp.org/state-policies-to-address-vertical-consolidation-in-health-care/.
- Brent Fulton, Health Care Market Concentration Trends In The United States: Evidence And Policy Responses, 36 Health Aff. 1530 (2017).
- Michael F. Furukawa et al., Consolidation of Providers Into Health Systems Increased Substantially, 2016–18, 39 Health Affairs 1321 (Aug. 2020).
- Vertical Integration: Hospital Ownership of Physician Practices Is Associated with Higher Prices and Spending, 33 Health Aff. 756, 760 (2014); The Effect of Hospital Acquisitions of Physician Practices on Prices and Spending, 59 J. Health Econ. 139 (2018); Total Expenditures per Patient in Hospital-Owned and Physician-Owned Physician Organizations in California, 312 JAMA 1663 (2014); Association of Financial Integration Between Physicians and Hospitals With Commercial Health Care Prices, 175 JAMA Internal Med. 1932, 1937 (2015)
- Zack Cooper et al., The Price Ain’t Right? Hospital Prices and Health Spending on the Privately Insured, 134 Q. J. Econ. 51 (Feb. 2019); Cory Capps and David Dranove, Hospital Consolidation and Negotiated PPO Prices, 23 Health Affairs 175 (Mar 2004); MedPac. Congressional Request on Health Care Provider Consolidation. March 2020. http://www.medpac.gov/docs/default-source/reports/mar20_medpac_ch15_sec.pdf?sfvrsn=0.
- Laura Tollen and Elizabeth Keating, COVID-19, Market Consolidation, And Price Growth, Health Affairs Blog, August 3, 2020. DOI: 10.1377/hblog20200728.592180.
- Katherine L. Gudiksen, et al., Preventing Anticompetitive Contracting Practices in Healthcare Markets, The Source on Healthcare Price & Competition (Sept. 2020), https://sourceonhealthcare.org/profile/preventing-anticompetitive-contracting-practices-in-healthcare-markets/?portfolioCats=1165%2C1166%2C1167.
- James C. Robinson, Hospital Tiers in Health Insurance: Balancing Consumer Choice with Financial Motives, 22 Health Aff. W3-135 (2003); Dennis P. Scanlon, Richard C. Lindrooth & Jon B. Christianson, Steering Patients to Safer Hospitals? The Effect of a Tiered Hospital Network on Hospital Admissions. 43 Health Serv. Research 1849 (2008); Matthew B. Frank, John Hsu, Mary Beth Landrum & Michael E. Chernew, The Impact of a Tiered Network on Hospital Choice, 50 Health Serv. Research 1628 (2015).
- Robert A. Berenson, Paul B. Ginsburg, Jon B. Christianson & Tracy Yee, The Growing Power of Some Provider to Win Steep Payment Increases from Insurers Suggests Policy Remedies May Be Needed, 31 HEALTH AFF. 973 (2012).
- Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 1367.49, 1367.50; Conn Gen. Stat. § 38a-477f(a), (b); Ind. Code § 27-1-37-7; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176O, § 9A(d), (e); Minn. Stat. § 62J.81.
- Robin Feldman and Charles Graves, Naked Price and Pharmaceutical Trade Secret Overreach, 22 Yale J. L. & Tech. 61 (2020); Katherine Gudiksen, Samuel L. Chang & Jaime S. King, The Secret of Health Care Prices: Why Transparency is in the Public Interest, Cal. Health Care Found. (July 16, 2019), https://www.chcf.org/publication/secret-health-care-prices/.
- Scott Allen & Marcella Bombardieri, A Handshake That Made Healthcare History, Boston Globe (December 28, 2008), https://www.bostonglobe.com/specials/2008/12/28/handshake-that-made-healthcare- history/QiWbywqb8olJsA3IZ11o1H/story.html.
- United States v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 248 F. Supp. 3d 720 (W.D.N.C. 2017), UFCW & Employers Benefit Trust, et al. v. Sutter Health, et al., No. CGC 14-538451 (Cal. Super. Ct. S.F. City and Cnty. 2019), People of the State of California ex rel Xaviar Becerra v. Sutter Health., CGC 18-565398 (Cal. Super. Ct. S.F. City and Cnty. 2019), and Sidibe v. Sutter Health, 4 F.Supp 3d 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (No. C 12–04854 LB).
- Becerra Complaint, People of the State of California ex rel Xavier Becerra v. Sutter Health., CGC 18-565398 (Cal. Super. Ct. S.F. City and Cnty. 2019).
- United States v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 248 F. Supp. 3d 720 (W.D.N.C. 2017).
- Robert Berenson, Jaime S. King, Katherine L. Gudiksen, Roslyn Murray, Adele Shartzer, Urban Institute Research Report: Addressing Health Care Market Consolidation and High Prices 37-39 (Jan. 2020), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/addressing-health-care-market-consolidation-and-high-prices.
- Emilio Varanini, Competition as Policy Reform: The Use of Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement, Market Governance Rules, and Incentives in Health Care, 11 St. Louis U. J. Health L. & Pol’Y 69, 86 (2018).
- Proposed Final Judgment, United States v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 248 F. Supp. 3d 720, 724 (W.D.N.C. 2017).
Katherine L. Gudiksen, MS, PhD is a senior health policy researcher at The Source for Healthcare Price and Competition. Erin C. Fuse Brown, JD, MPH, is the Cathy C. Henson Associate Professor of Law and director of the Center for Law, Health & Society at Georgia State University College of Law. Both Gudiksen and Fuse Brown produced this policy brief as consultants to the National Academy for State Health Policy (NASHP). Johanna Butler, BA, is a policy associate at NASHP.
This policy brief and the accompanying model legislation were produced with support from Arnold Ventures.
NASHP Model Act to Address Anticompetitive Terms in Health Insurance Contracts
/in Policy Consumer Affordability, Health System Costs, Hospital/Health System Oversight, Making the Case for Action /by NASHP StaffModel Act Summary:
This model legislation targets health insurance contract terms that have been used by health systems to impede competition and increase prices. In particular, this model act prohibits the use of most-favored-nation clauses, anti-steering clauses, anti-tiering clauses, all-or-nothing clauses, and gag clauses in contracts between health insurers and health care providers. The prohibition on these anticompetitive contract terms would be enforceable via administrative penalties by the State Insurance Department, civil penalties and antitrust remedies by the State Attorney General, and a private cause of action under the state’s unfair and deceptive acts or practices statute.
Section 1. [Section 1] is inserted in [State Insurance Code] to read as follows:
(A) Definitions: As used in this section:
i. “Enrollee” means an individual who is entitled to receive health care services under the terms of a health benefit plan.
ii. “Health care contract” means a contract, agreement, or understanding, either orally or in writing, entered into, amended, restated, or renewed between a health care provider and a health insurance carrier, health plan administrator, plan sponsor, or its contractors or agents for the delivery of health care services to an enrollee of a health benefit plan.
iii. “Health care provider” means an entity, corporation, or organization, parent corporation, member, affiliate, subsidiary, or entity under common ownership, whether for-profit or nonprofit, that is or whose members are licensed or otherwise authorized by this state to furnish, bill, or receive payment for health care service delivery in the normal course of business, and includes, without limitation, health systems, hospitals, hospital-based facilities, freestanding emergency facilities, imaging centers, large physician groups with eight [8] or more physicians, physician staffing organizations, and urgent care clinics.
[Commentary: States may want to define “large physician groups” separately or examine their physician market to define the numeric cutoff for a large physician group. The idea is to exclude the small practices that do not tend to exert market power in their health plan contract negotiations.]
iv. “Health insurance carrier” means an entity subject to the insurance laws and regulations of this state or subject to the jurisdiction of the [Insurance Commissioner] that offers health insurance, health benefits, or contracts for health care services, including prescription drug coverage, to large groups, small groups, or individuals on or outside the [Marketplace].
v. “Health benefit plan” means a plan, policy, contract, certificate, or agreement entered into, offered, or issued by a health insurance carrier or health plan administrator acting on behalf of a plan sponsor to provide, deliver, arrange for, pay for, or reimburse any of the costs of health care services and includes nonfederal governmental plans as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32).
[Commentary: States may already have a definition of “health benefit plan” or “health insurance carrier” in their statutes that can be referenced instead of adopting a new definition here. NASHP recommends defining “health benefit plan” broadly to include third-party administrators working on behalf of a plan sponsor, including self-funded employers and labor unions. States may choose to exclude long-term care plans, disability plans, and dental or vision plans.]
vi. “Health plan administrator” means a third-party administrator who acts on behalf of a plan sponsor to administer a health benefit plan.
vii. “Network plan” means a health benefit plan that either requires enrollees to use, or creates incentives, including financial incentives, for enrollees to use certain health care providers managed, owned, affiliated, under contract with, or employed by a health insurance carrier, a health plan administrator, or plan sponsor. Network plans include health maintenance organization (HMO) plans, preferred provider organization (PPO) plans, and exclusive provider organization (EPO) plans.
viii. “Tiered network plan” means a health benefit plan that sorts some or all types of health care providers into specific groups to which different provider reimbursement, enrollee cost sharing, or provider access requirements, or any combination thereof, are applied for the same services.
ix. “Anti-steering clause” means a provision of a health care contract that restricts the ability of the health insurance carrier or health plan administrator from encouraging an enrollee to obtain a health care service from a competitor of the hospital or health system, including offering incentives to encourage enrollees to utilize specific health care providers.
x. An “anti-tiering clause” means a provision in a health care contract that:
a. Restricts the ability of the health insurance carrier or health plan administrator to introduce or modify a tiered network plan or assign health care providers into tiers; or
b. Requires the health insurance carrier or health plan administrator to place all members of a health care provider in the same tier of a tiered network plan.
xi. An “all-or-nothing clause” means a provision of a health care contract that:
a. Requires the health insurance carrier or health plan administrator to include all members of a health care provider in a network plan; or
b. Requires the health insurance carrier or health plan administrator to enter into any additional contract with an affiliate of the health care provider as a condition of entering into a contract with such health care provider.
xii. A “most-favored-nations clause” means a provision of a health care contract that:
a. Prohibits or grants a health insurance carrier or health plan administrator an option to prohibit a participating health care provider from contracting with another contracting entity to provide health care services at the same or lower price than the payment specified in the health care contract;
b. Requires or grants a health insurance carrier or health plan administrator an option to require a participating health care provider to accept a lower payment in the event the participating health care provider agrees to provide health care services to another contracting entity at a lower price;
c. Requires or grants a health insurance carrier or health plan administrator an option to require termination or renegotiation of an existing health care contract if a participating health care provider agrees to provide health care services to another contracting entity at the same or lower price; or
d. Restricts other health insurance carriers or health plan administrators, not party to the contract, from paying the same or lower rates for items or services than the contracting health insurance carrier or health plan administrator pays for such items or services.
xiii. A “gag clause” means a provision of a health care contract that:
a. Restricts the ability of either the health insurance carrier, health plan administrator, or the provider to disclose any price or quality information, including the allowed amount, negotiated rates or discounts, any fees for services, or any other claim-related financial obligations included in the provider contract, to a governmental entity as authorized by law or its contractors or agents, any enrollee, treating provider of an enrollee, plan sponsor, or potential eligible enrollees and plan sponsors; or
b. Restricts the ability of either the health insurance carrier, health plan administrator, or the provider to disclose out-of-pocket costs to an enrollee.
(B) Limits on Anticompetitive Contract Terms.
i. Except as provided in [subsection 1(B)(iii)], no health insurance carrier, health care provider, health plan administrator, or any agents or other entities that contract on behalf of a health care provider, a health insurance carrier, or a health plan administrator may offer, solicit, request, amend, renew, or enter into a health care contract that would directly or indirectly include any of the following provisions:
a. A most-favored-nations clause;
b. An anti-steering clause;
c. An anti-tiering clause;
d. An all-or-nothing clause;
e. A gag clause; or
f. Any other clause that results or intends to result in anticompetitive effects as specified by the [Insurance Commissioner or State Attorney General] through regulation.
ii. Except as provided in [subsection 1(B)(iii)], a violation of this section constitutes an unfair or deceptive act under [insert state code section] and be presumptively unlawful under [reference state or federal antitrust laws], subject to enforcement by the State Attorney General.
[Commentary: Some states have a code section in their insurance or business codes defining unfair and deceptive acts or practices (UDAP) in the business of insurance, but NASHP recommends that states declare violations of this section as a violation of general UDAP laws so as not to limit enforcement actions to the Insurance Department and enable enforcement against health care providers and health systems for violations of this section by the State Attorney General.]iii. Application for a waiver:
a. A party to a health care contract, which contains a provision specified in [subsection 1(B)(i)], may submit the health care contract to the [Attorney General or Insurance Commissioner] for a waiver. The health care contract must be accompanied by the following information:
I. The name and business address of each party to the health care contract;
II. An identification of each location at which any party to the agreement or policy provides health care services; and
III. Any information required to demonstrate that the proposed agreement or policy results in an increase in the welfare of consumers in this State that could not have been accomplished through alternative means that are less restrictive.
b. The [Attorney General or Insurance Commissioner] shall approve or deny any waiver application in writing within 60 days.
c. The [Attorney General or Insurance Commissioner] may approve a waiver to allow a contract to include a provision specified in [subsection 1(B)(i)] if the [Attorney General or Insurance Commissioner] determines:
I. The agreement or policy results in an increase in the welfare of consumers in this State such that the procompetitive benefits of including the provision outweigh the harms to competition;
II. Such increase in the welfare could not have been accomplished through alternative means that are less restrictive; and
III. The agreement or policy does not otherwise constitute a contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade under [state or federal antitrust laws].
d. The [Attorney General or Insurance Commissioner] may promulgate rules under this section to identify allowable conduct, agreements, or arrangements for which waivers may be granted.
iv. Except for contracts granted a waiver under [Section 1(B)(iii)] by the [Attorney General or Insurance Commissioner], any provision of a health care contract described in [Section 1(B)] in violation of this section is null and void and unenforceable. The remaining provisions of the health care contract, excluding any provision in violation of this section, remain in effect and are enforceable.
[Commentary: This section allows the State Attorney General or Insurance Commissioner to review and approve contracts with a provision specified in [subsection 1(B)(i)] if the contract increases the public welfare, e.g., if the procompetitive benefits outweigh the anticompetitive harms. It also allows the State Attorney General or Insurance Commissioner to promulgate rules to define specific conditions under which the agency finds health care contracts are procompetitive, e.g., in specific types of accountable care organizations or other advanced payment models.](C) Enforcement.
i. Enforcement by State Attorney General
a. The Attorney General may subpoena any records necessary to enforce any provisions of [this Act] or to investigate suspected violations of any provisions of [this Act].
b. The Attorney General may institute proceedings on behalf of [the state, its agencies or municipal corporations] or as parens patriae of the persons residing in the state for:
I. Injunctive relief to prevent and restrain a violation of any provision of this chapter including, without limitation, a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction;
II. Civil penalties for violations of the provisions of [Section 1(B)];
III. Criminal penalties for violations of the provisions of [Section 1(B)]; or
IV. Other equitable relief for violations of the provisions of [this Act] including, without limitation, disgorgement or restitution.
ii. Enforcement by Insurance Commissioner
a. All records and papers of health insurance carriers pertaining to health benefit plans or negotiations between the health insurance carrier and any health care provider shall be subject to inspection by the [Insurance Commissioner] or by any agent he or she may designate for that purpose. The Insurance Commissioner may require any health insurance carrier to produce a list of all health care contracts, transactions, or pricing arrangements entered into within the preceding twelve (12) months.
b. Except for contracts granted a waiver under [Section 1(B)(iii)], the Insurance Commissioner may impose an administrative penalty of up to $5,000 upon a health insurance carrier per day for each day that a contract in violation of [Section 1(B)] is in effect.
c. The Insurance Commissioner may, under section [state rate review section] deny the sale of any health insurance plan where the contract between the health insurance carrier and any health care provider is in violation of [Section 1(B)].
d. The Insurance Commissioner may refer any health care contract subject to this section to the Attorney General to review the contract for compliance with this Act. The referral of any health care contract by the Insurance Commissioner to the Attorney General does not constitute a violation of any confidentiality agreement between the health insurance carrier and the Insurance Commissioner that may exist under [state rate filing laws]. The authority of the Attorney General to prosecute violations of antitrust or consumer protection requirements and shall not be narrowed, abrogated, or otherwise altered by this section.
iii. Private right of action.
a. Any party that suffers a loss as a result of the violation of [this Act] shall be entitled to initiate an action pursuant to [reference to state UDAP law] and seek all remedies, damages, costs, and fees available under [reference to state UDAP law].
(D) Construction.
i. Nothing in this section shall modify, reduce, or eliminate the existing privacy protections and standards provided by reason of State and Federal law, including the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) (Pub. L.104-191), the federal Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) (Pub. L. 110–233), and required confidentiality provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) (P.L. 110-325).
ii. Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit network design or cost or quality initiatives by a group health plan, health insurance carrier, or administrators working on behalf of a plan sponsor, including accountable care organizations, exclusive provider organizations, networks that tier providers by cost or quality or steer enrollees to centers of excellence, or other pay-for-performance programs.
[Commentary: The data privacy provision is included to ensure that the ban on gag clauses does not allow data protected by HIPAA or other privacy laws to be disclosed to employers or plan sponsors. The network provision provides assurances that the anti-steering and anti-tiering provisions do not limit insurers or administrators working on behalf of a plan sponsor from using other methods to direct patients to higher-value care. The network provision also expresses the intent of the legislature to allow health systems to create accountable care organizations or use other risk-based payment models to control costs.]
(E) Regulatory Authorization. The [Insurance Commissioner] and the [State Attorney General] may promulgate regulations necessary to implement, impose penalties, and ensure compliance with this section.
(F) Effective Date. This section shall apply with to any contract entered into or amended after the date of enactment of [this Act].
Section 2. Severability and Savings-Construction Clauses
(A) Every provision in [this Act] and every application of the provisions in [this Act] are severable from each other as a matter of state law. If any application of any provision in [this Act] to any person or group of persons or circumstances is found by a court to be invalid, the remainder of [this Act] and the application of the Act’s provisions to all other persons and circumstances may not be affected. All constitutionally valid applications of [this Act] shall be severed from any applications that a court finds to be invalid, leaving the valid applications in force, because it is the legislature’s intent and priority that the valid applications be allowed to stand alone. Even if a reviewing court finds a provision of [this Act] invalid in a large or substantial fraction of relevant cases, the remaining valid applications shall be severed and allowed to remain in force.
(B) [This Act] shall be construed, as a matter of state law, to be enforceable up to but no further than the maximum possible extent consistent with federal law and constitutional requirements, even if that construction is not readily apparent, as such constructions are authorized only to the extent necessary to save the statute from judicial invalidation.
April 8, 2021
Paying Family Caregivers through Medicaid Consumer-Directed Programs: State Opportunities and Innovations
/in The RAISE Act Family Caregiver Resource and Dissemination Center Connecticut, Florida, Virginia Featured News Home, Reports Chronic and Complex Populations, Chronic Disease Prevention and Management, Consumer Affordability, Cost, Payment, and Delivery Reform, Health Coverage and Access, Health System Costs, Long-Term Care, Medicaid Managed Care, Population Health, State Resources, The RAISE Family Caregiver Resource and Dissemination Center, Workforce Capacity /by Salom Teshale, Wendy Fox-Grage and Kitty PuringtonFamily members provide significant amounts of care to relatives with complex needs, including those who are Medicaid enrollees.
Individuals may hesitate about receiving care in congregate care settings, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, but many face home-based care service workforce shortages. Programs that incorporate family members who provide care can help support person-centered care for Medicaid enrollees and also help states address the demand for long-term services and supports. States have the opportunity to use Medicaid to support enrollees with long-term care needs and their families by developing consumer direction programs that allow family members to be hired to provide care. This report explores how Connecticut, Florida, and Virginia developed consumer-directed care programs to serve older adults and people with physical disabilities.
Introduction
COVID-19 has upended states’ long-term services and supports (LTSS) systems and strained congregate care facilities. A recent report suggests virtually all states have seen a significant drop in skilled nursing facility occupancy rates . The increasing demand for home-based care is exacerbating underlying challenges, such as long-standing LTSS direct care workforce shortages and gaps in meeting the needs of communities of color and speakers of different languages.
Medicaid consumer–directed care programs are an alternative way individuals can receive home-based services. Consumers choose and hire their care providers rather than having an agency dictate who delivers care.
To address these challenges, states are exploring how Medicaid options can support enrollees with long-term care needs through consumer direction programs (also called consumer-directed care programs, participant direction programs, or self-direction programs) that allow family members to be paid for providing care. States have developed and expanded consumer direction programs over the past decades. Given increasing interest in home-and community-based care over institutional care, consumer direction programs are a growing option to offer older adults and people with disabilities an alternative to institutionalization. This report highlights three states’ self-directed care programs that include older adults and people with physical disabilities.
Findings suggest consumer-directed programs can improve quality of life and health outcomes and can help meet participant needs without increasing Medicaid fraud.
Medicaid-funded consumer direction- programs allow enrollees to directly hire people, including some family members, to provide personal care, such as bathing, dressing, and toileting. According to the National Council on Disability, consideration of consumer-directed personal care options began in the late 1960s and 1970s with calls for increased autonomy and independence by and for people with disabilities. While early pilot programs focused on people with disabilities, the model – and its core values of autonomy and dignity – have since been applied to programs for older adults. Findings from the Cash and Counseling Demonstration Program suggest consumer-directed programs can improve quality of life and health outcomes and can help meet participant needs without increasing Medicaid fraud. While small-scale studies have shown savings, states can also incorporate cost-containment mechanisms into these models through waiver enrollment or spending caps, or reimbursement methodologies that limit consumer-directed care payment to a percentage of agency rates.
States are increasingly using consumer-directed models; according to Applied Self-Direction, all 50 states and Washington, DC have at least one consumer direction LTSS option. Several federal initiatives, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) guidance beginning in the early 2000s, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, and creation of the Community First Choice state plan option under the Affordable Care Act have expanded states’ ability to provide these programs. This trend is likely to continue as states:
- Seek to address issues raised by the COVID-19 pandemic;
- Promote equity and access to services in underserved communities; and
- Address growing work force shortages.
Modifying or expanding consumer-directed programs can be an important strategy.
How States Can Develop Consumer-Directed Programs
States have multiple decision points when developing a Medicaid consumer-directed program.
Medicaid Authority: States can use various Medicaid authorities to support consumer-directed options that allow family members to receive reimbursement for providing care. Policymakers have many factors to consider when designing these waivers and/or state plan amendments, such as whether to expand Medicaid eligibility, whether to target specific populations or geographic areas, and what services and supports should be provided.
The majority of states operate consumer-directed programs through the Medicaid 1915(c) home- and community-based waiver (HCBS) authority. Using 1915(c) waivers, states can modify eligibility requirements, target services to particular areas of the state, and/or limit or tailor services to certain populations, such as older adults or adults with physical disabilities who are at risk of institutionalization. States can, depending on the authority, add self-direction options for different services into a single waiver.
Chart: Medicaid Authorities and Consumer-Direction Options
| Medicaid authority | Is institutional level of care required? | Can states waive comparability? | Can states waive statewideness? | Financial management services required? | Budget authority/
cash payments allowed? |
Limits on reimbursing family caregivers |
| 1905 (a) (24) state plan personal care services | As medically necessary | No | No | Only fiscal employer agent required | Neither budget authority nor cash payments are allowed | Excludes “legally responsible individuals” |
| 1915(c) Home and Community-Based Services | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Budget authority is allowed, but cash payments are not | Allows relatives, legally responsible individuals, and legal guardians |
| 1915 (i) Home and Community-Based Services state plan option | No (allows individuals with less than institutional level-of-care requirements depending on certain types of eligibility) | Yes | No | Yes | Budget authority is allowed but cash payments are not | Allows relatives, legally responsible individuals, and legal guardians |
| 1915(j) self-directed personal assistance services state plan option | No, if receiving services through state plan and state plan does not require it
Yes, if receiving services through a 1915 (c) waiver |
Yes | Yes | Yes, unless participants choose to receive cash directly | Budget authority is required, cash payments are allowed | Allows legally responsible relatives |
| 1915(k) Community First Choice State Plan Option | Yes | No | No | Yes, depending on the model selected | States may allow budget authority and cash payments to participants depending on the model selected | Allows legally responsible individuals, relatives |
| 1115 Demonstration Waiver | Determined by state | Determined by state | Yes | Yes, when incorporating participant- direction | States may allow budget authority and cash payments to participants | Allows legally responsible individuals, relatives |
Sources:
Authority Comparison Chart. HCBS Technical Assistance Web Site. Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Accessed Dec. 31, 2020.
Home and Community Based Services Authorities. Medicaid.gov. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Accessed Dec. 31, 2020.
Self-Directed Services, Medicaid.gov (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services), accessed Dec. 31, 2020.
Participant Direction Features of the Optional Medicaid Authorities, Table 7-1, p. 182. O’Keeffe, Janet, Paul Saucier, Beth Jackson, Robin Cooper, Ernest McKenney, Suzanne Crisp, and Charles Moseley. Understanding Medicaid home and community services: A primer, 2010 edition. Washington DC: US Department of Health and Human Services and RTI International, 2010.
Wolff, Jennifer, Karen Davis, Mark Leeds, Lorraine Narawa, Ian Stockwell, and Cynthia Woodcock. Family Caregivers as Paid Personal Care Attendants in Medicaid. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, 2016.
Enrollee authority: States can determine how care recipients manage their budgets, caregivers, and services:
- Employer authority permits recipients to directly recruit and manage their service providers. Employer authority is integral to the consumer direction model. Depending on the authority, states have some flexibility to determine which employer responsibilities can be consumer-directed.
- Budget authority allows enrollees to manage their budgets and purchase other goods and services. States also have flexibility in determining what types of goods and services can be purchased under budget authority.
Enrollee supports: States are required to provide supports for enrollees in managing the consumer-direction process, which can include training and assistance, information about responsibilities, or access to financial management services. For example, Virginia’s 1915(c) waivers include a “services facilitator” to support individuals in managing consumer-directed services.
Definition of “family:” States have discretion to determine who may provide HCBS under consumer direction. Under most authorities, states have flexibility to allow services to be provided by family members, including “legally responsible individuals” such as spouses or parents of minor children under specific circumstances. Within the 1915(c) waiver, for example, states have the option to allow relatives to provide waiver services, and/or allow legally responsible individuals, such as spouses and parents of minor children, to provide personal care services. When delivering personal care-related services, the legally responsible person must be providing care that is beyond the care normally expected of a spouse or parent. In defining family for reimbursement, the state plan personal care option is the exception: legally responsible individuals may not be paid under this authority to provide personal care services.
Training and workforce requirements: State Medicaid agencies often require background checks or certification requirements for caregivers.
- States vary in the specifics of the training requirements for caregivers hired under consumer direction. Florida does not require licensing or certification to provide personal care, homemaker, or adult companion services, but does require licensure for attendant care.
- States can, through legislation, specify the types of tasks that can be delegated by a nurse to an unlicensed caregiver who receives training, as in the example of Virginia’s regulations on nurse delegation. The AARP 2020 LTSS Scorecard found that 26 states allow nurses to delegate at least 14 health maintenance tasks to be performed by a direct care aide, such as medication administration, respiratory care, tube feeding/gastric care, and/or bladder regimen and skin/appliance care-related tasks.
Use of representatives: Participants can choose to have a representative assist them with managing their consumer-directed services. Individuals may appoint a family member as a representative, but that family member cannot be paid to be the participant’s representative, or provide paid care to the participant. (Note: Due to the COVID-19 emergency, emergency flexibilities may allow states to waive certain requirements during the public health emergency. For example, West Virginia’s Appendix K for its 1915[c] waivers allows legal representatives to receive payment for certain personal care-related services under specific circumstances during the emergency.)
Three State Approaches
States can structure consumer-directed program options in a variety of ways, reflecting the needs of their residents. After a nationwide scan of Medicaid waivers and state plan options for older adults and adults with physical disabilities, the National Academy for State Health Policy (NASHP) identified three states — Connecticut, Florida, and Virginia — that have long-standing consumer-directed care programs and illustrate the various policy strategies available to states to help Medicaid enrollees (and their family caregivers) who are older adults or have physical disabilities live in their communities.
Connecticut’s 1915(k) Community First Choice (CFC) State Plan Amendment was approved in 2015. Enrollees in Connecticut’s CFC option may hire, supervise, and train their own staff and manage their budgets themselves or with support of an individual other than a spouse or legally liable individual.
- Medicaid authority: 1915(k) Community First Choice (CFC) state plan option
- Services: Attendant care, transitional services, home-delivered meals, environmental accessibility adaptations, assistive technology, and voluntary training on how to hire/manage/dismiss staff
- Family caregivers: Enrollees in the CFC option can hire family members or other individuals as long as they meet qualification requirements. (Excludes spouses and legally responsible individuals, health care representatives, conservators, or guardians.) Caregivers may live in the home.
Enrollees create job descriptions. Participants who choose to hire an attendant can request a pay rate subject to approval of the state. They can offer a particular wage if they believe the job description merits it (e.g., special skills, fluency in a particular language, etc.). In its 1915(k) SPA, Connecticut recommends that attendants, “be at least 16 years of age; have experience providing personal care; be able to follow written or verbal instructions given by the individual or the individual’s representative or designee; be physically able to perform the services required; and be able to receive and follow instructions given by the individual or the individual’s representative or designee.” Connecticut provides access to additional employee training opportunities, such as coordinating with a community college to provide personal attendant training certification or certified nursing assistant (CNA) training for personal care assistants (PCAs).
The Medicaid enrollee is considered the employer. The state’s Division of Health Services (DHS) establishes the budget and determines how much of the budget can be spent each month. If participants continually exceed their budget, they may lose access to the option, and DHS also tracks underutilization. While DHS does not specifically track the use of paid family personal care providers, a state official estimates that approximately 30 percent of the roughly 4,000 individuals who use the service engage family caregivers as PCAs. Connecticut’s CFC option can include older adults and people with physical disabilities, and Medicaid enrollees who require institutional levels of care are eligible.
Monitoring for fraud and abuse. Connecticut’s Quality Assurance unit examines referrals and has systems and controls in place to examine and flag PCA hours. One example of a system control is related to the state’s policy that disallows PCA services while a member is hospitalized. To disallow payments to PCAs submitting claims during their employer’s hospitalization, Connecticut’s Medicaid Management Information System (MMIS) compares PCA claims for the enrollee to hospital claims for the enrollee. If there is a hospital claim on the same day as a PCA’s claim, the PCA claim is not paid. In addition, the fiscal intermediary monitors for fraud and abuse. The state also established a fraud and abuse hotline and online reporting capacity to encourage public reporting.
Reimbursement. Connecticut established a universal assessment to evaluate levels of care for all Medicaid enrollees with HCBS needs in 2015, at the same time as the CFC option was being developed. Data from this universal needs assessment has been used since then to determine tiered budget groupings within the CFC option as well. Because CFC budgets are driven by the universal assessment — as are its other HCBS programs – a Connecticut state official reported costs did not differ greatly across programs. The state is in the process of working with consultants, including the University of Connecticut, to review the tool and the data collected from the universal assessment and to revise the current budget groupings.
Payment. The fiscal intermediary pays the PCA, then submits claims for reimbursement through the Medicaid Management Information System (MMIS). The state sends information about individual budgets to the fiscal intermediary. If enrollees want to pay their PCAs a different payment rate than listed in their individual budgets, they must submit documents about how risk would be managed. This is because individual budgets are based on needed hours at the minimum wage rate. While it is permissible for participants to request higher wages, this decision decreases the number of hours available within the budget. In 2020, Connecticut selected Allied Community Resources as its fiscal intermediary through a request for proposals. The provider fee schedule is posted at ctdssmap.com. As of 2020, PCAs in Connecticut are unionized and their minimum payment rate has increased. Some program costs also have increased accordingly.
Florida
In Florida’s participant-directed option (PDO), the managed care plan sets the fee schedule and makes payments. The PDO, which is provided by Florida’s Statewide Medicaid Managed Long-Term Care program, can serve both older adults and people with physical disabilities. The enrollee has responsibility for finding, training, and managing workers, setting hours, reporting fraud or abuse, and submitting timesheets to the managed care plan, among other responsibilities.
- Medicaid authority: Statewide Medicaid Managed Care Long-Term Care (LTC) 1915(b)/(c) waiver, which includes a participant-directed option (PDO)
- Services: Allows five services through PDO: adult companion, homemaker, attendant care, intermittent and skilled nursing, and personal care services
- Family caregivers: Legally responsible individuals, including spouses, can provide PDO services as long as the caregiver is qualified, has executed a PDO work agreement, and has passed the necessary background checks; the enrollee can live in their own home or in a family member’s home.
The PDO initially began as a consumer direction pilot in 2000 administered by the state’s Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) and the Department of Elder Affairs (DOEA). In 2013, the participant-directed option was transitioned into the Statewide Medicaid Managed Care Long-Term Care (SMMC-LTC) program. Eight managed care plans offer PDOs. As of June 2020, slightly more than 119,000 enrollees were enrolled in the SMMC-LTC program overall. According to state data, out of 51,848 HCBS enrollees, 7,841 were participating in the PDO as of June 2020.
Specific family caregiver hiring information is not reported in the care plan, although all care is documented in the care plan, including whether services are administered through the PDO or traditional options. Because the PDO offers flexibility in hiring caregivers, the option can be used by enrollees who desire culturally competent caregivers, or who are not satisfied with other available options. Legally responsible individuals, including spouses, can receive reimbursement. In 2020, Florida included a caregiver training benefit as part of its LTC Waiver. Training is available based on a caregiver assessment administered through the managed care plan. Each managed care plan has its own training program. This caregiver training support can be utilized only for unpaid caregivers, however.
Monitoring for fraud and abuse. The Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), Florida’s Medicaid agency, monitors for fraud and waste through the state’s contracted Medicaid managed care plans, which are required to provide fiscal/employer agent (F/EA) services. The managed care plan either operates as a F/EA, or subcontracts to an F/EA vendor. The managed care plan is responsible for fulfilling certain F/EA-related tasks, including reporting of underutilization to participants/case managers, and following up with timesheet issues. AHCA conducts a desk review every quarter, which involves an audit process for compliance.
Reimbursement. Each plan has a designated fee schedule, and there are no caps from AHCA on the number of PDO hours that can be received by an enrollee, which is determined by medical necessity. Managed care plans or their vendors who serve as F/EAs provide payroll and tax management services for participants and are responsible for processing and payment of all applicable taxes on behalf of participants and their workers.
Virginia
Virginia’s consumer-directed option began in the mid-1990s and was available only to individuals with physical disabilities. Virginia’s options expanded over time to include individuals with cognitive impairment, and additional services, such as companion services and respite. These consumer-directed program services have since been incorporated into Virginia’s HCBS waivers. Consumer direction for older adults and people with physical disabilities is part of the Commonwealth Coordinated Care Plus (CCC Plus) program operated under a 1915b/c waiver.
- Medicaid authority: Commonwealth Coordinated Care Plus 1915(b)/(c) waiver program
- Services: Participants have the option to self-direct personal care and respite services
- Family caregivers: As of 2020, relatives other than spouses or parents of minor children can be reimbursed for services, however, during the pandemic, spouses and parents of minor children can be reimbursed for care.
Enrollees selecting consumer direction are provided with a list of “services facilitators” as part of the screening process for level-of-care eligibility assessment (administered by local Virginia Department of Health nurses and physicians or local departments of social services’ family services specialists). Services facilitators are Medicaid-enrolled providers who support participants in managing their consumer directed services. Services facilitators can:
- Assess a participant for particular consumer-directed services;
- Help develop a plan of care; and
- Provide training and support to the participant in performing their role as employer.
Participants can select workers and are considered the employer, but do not have decision-making authority over the budget. Within CCC Plus, a legally responsible relative can serve as the participant’s representative and be the employer if the participant is not independently able to self-direct care, but this relative cannot also be a services facilitator, paid caregiver, or attendant. Spouses and parents of children cannot be paid to provide personal care services, but other relatives can be paid under specific circumstances. Currently, flexibilities instituted due to COVID-19 under Virginia’s Appendix K waiver allow spouses and parents of children to provide services during the public health emergency.
Consumer direction is available for members living in their own homes or in family members’ homes. An estimated 40 percent of caregivers are family members, according to key informant estimates.
Monitoring for fraud and abuse. Payments to family caregivers under the CCC Plus program are monitored through the Quality Management review process in the Department of Medical Assistance Services (DMAS) using the same processes used to monitor other home-based and personal care services. However, if payments are made to a family member living in the same home as the participant, the member must provide documentation to justify hiring the relative who lives in the same home as an “option of last resort.” There are no limits that are specific to relatives on the number of hours of services that can be furnished.
Reimbursement. Participants in Virginia’s consumer-directed option must use a fiscal/employer agent, who conducts payroll functions on the participant’s behalf, including payment and withholding. DMAS issued a request for proposals to select the state’s fiscal/employer agent. The fiscal/employer agent must also process background checks. Managed care organizations in CCC Plus contract with a fiscal/employer agent, and follow the same processes as the state for consumer-direction. In the 2020 budget, a 5 percent increase beginning July 2020 and a 2 percent increase beginning in July 2021 to the salary rate for attendants was approved. Time and a-half payment up to 16 hours was also approved for attendants working over 40 hours per week providing Medicaid consumer-directed personal assistance, respite, and companion services.
Lessons Learned
State policy leaders interviewed for this report all expressed value for program flexibility and choice for enrollees receiving care. They also noted the broader state goals of providing home- and community-based services alternatives over institutional services as a critical factor in supporting self-direction for people requiring institutional levels of care, and paying family caregivers. Across the highlighted states, additional themes emerged:
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- Consumer direction provides an important opportunity to support health equity and culturally competent care. By giving enrollees flexibility to select caregivers and employ family members, states enhanced their ability to support the needs of underserved populations. Both Florida and Connecticut officials highlighted that the consumer-directed option allowed participants to hire caregivers who met their cultural and linguistic needs. Connecticut’s Community First Choice state plan option allows enrollees, as the hiring employer, to develop job descriptions that can include speaking a specific language or possessing a particular type of certification.
- Paying family caregivers can be a cost-neutral Medicaid rebalancing strategy. States can set comparable (or lower) rates for family caregivers, manage service utilization, and support more individuals in home and community settings. Connecticut state health officials anticipated a shift from institutional care toward community-based services through use of its Community First Choice (CFC) option, and results are tracking accurately to the state’s initial estimates. Connecticut also reports a lower dependence on home health agencies. Utilization of Connecticut’s CFC program has grown since 2015, but a state official noted significant savings in other services. The CFC option also benefits from a 6 percent enhanced federal match. A state official in Florida also noted that the state PDO’s lower service costs make the program competitive when compared to similar services provided by a traditional vendor.
- Outreach to Medicaid enrollees is critical. States noted that the complexity of these programs can be a challenge to enrollment, particularly among participants who are uncertain about whether they would be required to manage their own budgets. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and interest in avoiding facility-based care, states may have a heightened opportunity to raise awareness about consumer-directed options for personal care-related services.
Effects of COVID-19
Enrollment support for consumer-directed programs in the three states has increased as reliance on family caregivers grew during the pandemic:
- Within a week of declaring the emergency, Connecticut permitted expedited enrollment so enrollees could hire family caregivers, and the state also allowed overtime. Connecticut has commissioned a report from the University of Connecticut to examine the impact of COVID-19 on LTSS.
- Florida encouraged enrollment in its PDO to obtain or provide care during COVID-19, and the state has since documented an increase in new enrollees. State administrators report they are not concerned about sustaining their managed care PDO option because the option is cost-effective.
- Virginia officials noted that family members have been designating themselves as live-in caregivers in response to COVID-19. Virginia used CARES Act funding to provide personal protective equipment (PPE) to caregivers and advocate in particular for caregivers of color. CARES Act funding was also used to provide COVID-19-related hazard pay to consumer-directed caregivers who worked during the first few months of the pandemic.
- States may want to consider enhancing data collection to better identify family caregivers who are reimbursed through consumer-directed programs. States do not currently track whether enrollees in consumer-directed programs hire family members. States can consider tracking data on family caregivers within consumer-directed options to better understand the fiscal and health impact of incorporating family caregivers within these programs. Virginia officials are interested in developing mechanisms to encourage individuals who provide care to identify themselves as family caregivers. States could also support data collection to better analyze whether services are reaching at-risk populations and to better support underserved populations, including caregivers of different ethnic or racial backgrounds.
- States have a number of strategies they can use to prevent fraud and abuse. A 2017 GAO report notes that personal care services are particularly prone to incomplete data, overbilling, and risk of neglect for vulnerable enrollees. States can incorporate a range of policies that can mitigate the risk of fraud while improving the quality of care, such as:
- Criminal background checks;
- Service provider requirements and training; and
- Use of care managers.
States can also leverage electronic visit verification (EVV) technology (mandated by the 21st Century Cures Act for personal care and home-based services) to mitigate fraud and abuse. Anticipating the particular needs of consumer-directed enrollees and family caregivers can help. Also, flexible scheduling, user-friendly technology, and active engagement of stakeholders in implementation can avoid challenges. Florida noted that some MCOs provide tablets to family caregivers to utilize for EVV.
- Understand how employment and scope-of-practice laws can affect family caregivers receiving reimbursement through a consumer-directed option. Family caregivers can be considered employees and subject to a range of state and federal regulations that can impact state Medicaid programs. When the US Department of Labor issued a Final Rule regarding the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) that live-in caregivers for specific services could be included in receiving overtime, Florida noted that overtime hour claims increased. Plans subsequently required use of in-network providers for service hours over 40 hours per week. While Virginia’s program focuses on caregivers who do not provide services that licensed or certified professionals provide, Virginia’s Nurse Practice Act has been amended to allow a nurse to delegate authority to caregivers to render certain tasks without violation of licensing regulations under specific circumstances.
Conclusion
The COVID-19 pandemic is reinvigorating long-standing state efforts to support older adults and others with LTSS needs while reducing reliance on congregate settings of care. Reimbursing family members to provide some services can help states rebalance long-term care toward more home- and-community-based options and promote more person-centered long-term care, especially for underserved populations. These considerations are particularly important as states consider winding down various program changes put in place in response to the pandemic. As policymakers consider ways to support enrollees while balancing financial considerations, robust consumer-directed options that engage family caregivers can provide important and person-centered strategies for long-term care.
Acknowledgements: The National Academy for State Health Policy (NASHP) thanks Dawn Lambert, Co-Leader, Community Options Unit, Division of Health Services (CT), Karen Kimsey, Director, Department of Medical Assistance Services (VA), and Eunice Medina, Bureau Chief, Medicaid Plan Management Operations, Agency for Health Care Administration (FL) for sharing their time, expertise, and input on this report. NASHP also greatly appreciates The John A. Hartford Foundation for its support of NASHP’s work related to family caregiving and state policy.
Independent Analysis Finds Montana Has Saved Millions by Moving Hospital Rate Negotiations to Reference-Based Pricing
/in Policy Montana Blogs, Featured News Home Consumer Affordability, Cost, Payment, and Delivery Reform, Health System Costs, Hospital/Health System Oversight, Making the Case for Action, State Employee Health Plans, Value-Based Purchasing /by Johanna ButlerA new, independent analysis of the Montana state employee health plan’s transition to reference-based pricing – which limits hospital prices to a multiple of what Medicare pays – found significant savings for the state in the two years after its implementation. Further, there is no evidence that utilization artificially increased as a result of the new payment model, which could occur if hospitals needlessly push more services onto patients to offset lower reimbursement rates, and, to date, there have been no hospital closures in the state.
Facing rising health care costs and dwindling reserves, Montana’s state employee health plan implemented Medicare referenced-based pricing for its approximately 31,000 members in July 2016. The state set out to address the prices the plan was paying for hospital outpatient, inpatient, and physician services instead of reducing plan costs by increasing employees’ out-of-pocket costs or adopting coverage restrictions.
Prior to implementing reference-based pricing, Montana’s third-party administrator negotiated hospital reimbursement rates as a discount off a hospital’s chargemaster rates, similar to traditional negotiations used by most health insurers when contracting with hospitals. However, because hospitals do not have to follow a standard formula or legal requirements for setting chargemaster prices, these rates can be set much higher than what it actually costs a hospital for providing services, even after the plan’s negotiated discount.
In moving to reference-based pricing, Montana established payment rates for inpatient and outpatient services that are a multiple of Medicare’s payment rate for the Montana acute care hospitals. Before the reference-based pricing agreements, Montana paid a range of 191 to 322 percent of Medicare rates for inpatient services and 239 to 611 percent of Medicare rates for hospital outpatient services. The reference-based pricing agreements lowered the range in prices paid by the health plan to 220 to 225 percent for inpatient services and 230 to 250 percent for outpatient services.
Optumas, an independent consulting firm with expertise in health care reform, used publicly available data to analyze the financial impact of the plan’s transition to reference-based pricing. Using data for the three fiscal years before and after the implementation of reference-based pricing (SFY 14 through SFY 19), Optumas calculated what the plan would have paid under traditional (without reference pricing) negotiations based on a discount off chargemaster rates and compared the estimated payments to what the Montana plan actually paid under reference pricing.
Through these comparisons, Optumas was able to estimate savings associated with the reference-pricing initiative. In total, the plan’s estimated savings for inpatient services were $30.3 million and outpatient services savings were $17.5 million – for a combined savings of $47.8 million. This savings enabled the plan to become more financially sustainable and achieved Montana’s financial goal without pushing costs onto employees or reducing coverage.
Using Medicare rates as a benchmark not only saves Montana tax dollars, but the state employee health plan is subject to more transparent price increases. Instead of being tied to opaque hospital chargemaster price increases, the Montana state employee health plan relies on Medicare’s published pricing methodology, which is updated annually, geographically adjusted, and publicly available.
State employee health plans interested in lowering hospital costs without significantly disrupting coverage may be able to use Montana’s reference pricing approach to reduce health care costs. Reference-based pricing could also be used by commercial purchasers or by states working to cap prices in public-option plans.
To learn more, read Optumas’ report, Independent Evaluation – Estimating the Impact of Reference-Based Hospital Pricing in the Montana State Employee Plan.
The National Academy for State Health Policy is planning a webinar to explore these findings.
A hospital chargemaster is the standard list prices for hospital services. Chargemaster rates are essentially the health care market equivalent of Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Price (MSRP) in the car buying market.
Montana’s reference-based pricing agreements with hospitals:
- Generated estimated savings of $47.8 million across inpatient and outpatient services (SFY 17-SFY 19);
- Lowered prices paid for hospital outpatient services from a range of 239-611 percent of Medicare rates to 230-250 percent of Medicare rates; and
- Lowered prices paid for hospital inpatient services from 191-322 percent of Medicare rates to 220-225 percent of Medicare rates.
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For individuals living with complex, often chronic conditions, and their families, palliative care can provide relief from symptoms, improve satisfaction and outcomes, and help address critical mental and spiritual needs during difficult times. Now more than ever, there is growing recognition of the importance of palliative care services for individuals with serious illness, such as advance care planning, pain and symptom management, care coordination, and team-based, multi-disciplinary support. These services can help patients and families cope with the symptoms and stressors of disease, better anticipate and avoid crises, and reduce unnecessary and/or unwanted care. While this model is grounded in evidence that demonstrates improved quality of life, better outcomes, and reduced cost for patients, only a fraction of individuals who could benefit from palliative care receive it. 























































































































































